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Beam argues that in the domain of practical reasoning, and especially in ethical 
discussions, appeals to emotions play an important role. In his view, moral arguments often 
rely on different kinds of appeals to emotions: 
 
- we appeal to pity if we want to suscite sympathy for human suffering; 
- we appeal to fear if we want a person to realize that he should have prudential concern with 
how others will respond to his actions; and 
- we appeal to authority and popularity in the context of law and democracy if we want to 
emphasize that the consensus of humanity should have a bearing on moral decisions. 
 
The central problem for the the author is that, although appeals to emotions are 
considered as fallacies in traditional textbooks on logic and fallacies, they play a central role 
in moral discussions. So the question he wants to answer is when these appeals to emotions 
are problematic and when not.  
The authors concludes that reliance on appeals to sympathy, prudence, or popularity is 
inescapable in moral argument, and can be perfectly valid. In his view, “there are subtle and 
crude versions of these appeals, but there is no purer, more rational and objective form of 
moral argument that transcends them.” So, they are inescapable, necessary forms of arguing 
in moral discussions. Students should learn to critically assess why some are more cogent 
than others. Criteria of adequacy could be proposed. Students need to be warned that these 
appeals need to be evaluated critically in ethical contexts. Strategies should be outlined for 
arguing back against such appeals. 
 
 
Critique and suggestions 
 
I agree with the author that an appeal to sympathy, prudence, and authority or 
consensus of a majority can be an adequate way of defending a standpoint in certain contexts 
and that they can be fallacious in other contexts. I also agree with him that these forms of 
argumentation are no logical fallacies, but that it concerns forms of argumentation that can be 
correct or incorrect depending on the context in which they are used. 
 Therefore it is necessary to determine in which contexts such forms of argumentation 
are correct and contribute to a rational resolution of the dispute and in which contexts they 
should be considered as fallacious. In my view, with respect to this question the pragma-
dialectical argumentation theory developed by van Eemeren and Grootendorst in 
Argumentation, Communication and Fallacies (1992) offers a systematic theoretical 
framework for distinguishing between correct and incorrect forms of argumentation. 
The pragma-dialectical theory considers fallacies as violations of a discussion rule, as 
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an incorrect discussion move, in a certain stage of a critical discussion aimed at the resolution 
of a dispute. A discussion move is incorrect if it frustrates in any way the resolution of the 
dispute. It does so if it violates a discussion rule which has the function of promoting the 
resolution of the dispute. 
 The advantage of this approach is that it makes it possible to dinstinguish between 
correct and incorrect forms of argumentation on the basis of a clear criterium: the question 
whether or not a discussion rule has been violated. Another advantage is that it can be 
explained why the discussion move is incorrect by explaining in which way it frustrates the 
resolution of the dispute. 
 Different forms of appeal to emotions amount to different violations of different 
discussion rules because they frustrate the resolution in a different way. 
I will consider the different forms of an appeal to emotions discussed by Beam and 
explain in the context of which pragma-dialectical discussion rules they should be located. I 
will show that they can form violations of different rules of discussion and that they can 
frustrate the resolution in different ways. On the basis of this analysis it becomes clear that to 
be able to establish the fallaciousness of these forms of argumentation it must be determined 
in which context they are used and which common starting points and evaluation criteria are 
operative in a particular discussion. 
 
 
Appeals to pity and appeals to fear 
 
The first category described by Beam, the appeals to pity and fear, constitute a fallacy 
if they are a violation of Rule 4 that formulates the requirement that the argumentation in a 
critical discussion must genuinely pertain to the disputed standpoint: 
 
Rule 4:  
A party may defend his standpoint only by advancing argumentation relating to that 
standpoint.1
 
Rule 4 can be violated when the standpoint is defended by means other than argumentation. If 
this is the case, we are confronted with nonargumentative means of persuasion. 
 The fallacy committed by using nonargumentative means of persuasion is that a real 
resolution of the dispute is prevented because the standpoint is not being defended by means 
of rational arguments. If there is no serious attempt to rationally justify or refute a disputed 
claim, the difference of opinion cannot be resolved in a rational way. These 
nonargumentative means of persuasion are often aimed at a third party, they are often used as 
rhetorical techniques to gain victory in the eyes of an audience of outsiders. This is often 
done when the protagonist plays on the emotions and prejudices of the audience. 
 Playing on the emotions of the audience can be appeals to 'positive' emotions such as 
feelings of safety and loyalty, and they can be appeals to 'negative' emotions such as fear, 
greed, and shame. Often it is enough to give these emotions 'presence' without linking them 
explicitly to the defended standpoint. The audience will itself make the desired connection 
with the standpoint at issue. By manipulating the audience in this way, the protagonist can try 
to get his standpoint accepted without really defending it. 
 So, these techniques can be fallacious if they take the place of argumentation. They 
can be correct if they are only used to emphasize certain common starting points when there 
is also argumentation put forward. 
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Appeals to authority and popularity 
 
The second category described by Beam, the appeals to authority and popular opinion, 
constitute a fallacy if they are a violation of Rule 7 that formulates the requirement that a 
disputed standpoint can only be defended by argumentation that is based on an appropriate 
argumentation scheme: 
 
Rule 7: 
A party may not regard a standpoint as conclusively defended if the defense does not 
take place by means of an appropriate argumentation scheme that is correctly 
applied.2
 
In arguments from authority, someone's expertise or special position is treated as a sign that 
the proposition ascribed to him is acceptable. The proposition is regarded as acceptable 
because an authoritative source says it. To able to use this argumentation scheme in the 
defense of a standpoint, it is necessary that the antagonist recognizes it as sound. If the 
protagonist chooses it even though he knows that this is not so, he is guilty of a violation of 
rule 7 known as argumentum ad verecundiam. 
 Another body of authority is the number of people who believe something: Something 
is so, or good, because everybody thinks it is so, or good. If it is inappropriate to adduce the 
premise that the mass of the people is decisive as an extra (so far unexpressed) premise to the 
argumentation, then the wrong argumentation scheme has been chosen. This particular 
violation of Rule 7 constitutes a variant of the argumentum ad verecundiam that is known as 
argumentum ad populum. Because of its appeal to the mass of the people, this form of the 
argumentum ad populum is also described as the populistic fallacy. 
So, from a pragma-dialectical perspective both groups of fallacies addressed by Beam 
imply that the protagonist in a discussion wrongly assumes or wrongly pretends that he is 
using an appropriate form of argumentation. A violation of Rule 4 implies that there is no 
argumentation, a violation of Rule 7 implies that there is inappropriate argumentation. 
As I have shown, the pragma-dialectical theory clarifies that there are various appeals 
to emotions, and that to establish whether they constitute a fallacy it is first necessary to 
determine what exactly happens in the discussion and whether the behaviour forms a 
violation of a discussion rule. 
So, taking into account these pragma-dialectical insights, I think Beam needs to 
clarify certain points in his endeavor to develop a theory about certain types of fallacies of 
pity and fear in the context of ethical discussions. 
 First, he must clarify the common aspects of the two categories of fallacies that, in his 
view, appeal in some way to the emotions of the audience. As presented here, the two 
categories do not seem to have much in common, apart from the fact that they often occur in 
ethical discussions. As we have seen, the first category of fallacies that appeal to emotions, 
the fallacies of pity and fear, can be considered as a violation of a discussion rule because 
they do not constitute a rational method of convincing but play on emotions that are not 
relevant to the standpoint. The second category, the fallacies of authority and popularity, can 
be considered as a violation of a discussion rule because an authority or the communis opinio 
is, erroneously, presented as conclusive proof. Something is presented as a common 
argumentation method which is not so. 
 Second, he must clarify why the discussed argumentation techniques are correct in 
certain cases and incorrect in other cases. As I have shown, this can be done by explaining in 
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which way a particular discussion move frustrates the resolution of a difference of opinion. In 
this way, clear criteria for criticizing certain forms of these arguments could be developed 
and it could be investigated how incorrect forms could be refuted by counter-arguments. 
The suggested additions also involve a critical analysis of actual moral discussions. 
With respect to rule 4 it should be investigated in which moral contexts reference to emotions 
is relevant as an argument for defending a standpoint. With respect to rule 7 it should be 
found out when authorities and the opinion of the majority can be an adequate argument for 
accepting a standpoint. On the basis of an analysis of the context in which the argumentation 
is used and on the basis of the evaluation criteria that are relevant in a specific context it 
should be established how these arguments are used and in which cases they form a 
constructive contribution and in which cases they obstruct the resolution of the difference of 
opinion. 
 
 
Notes 
 
                                                 
1. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:132 ff.). 
2. See van Eemeren and Grootendorst (1992:160).  
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